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Summary:  
This policy paper was completed in September 2005 by an independent economic think 
tank from Belarus, which due to the sensitive political situation of the country does not 
wish to be named. The views presented in the paper are not necessary those of the Pontis 
Foundation.. The conclusion contains the remarks of the Pontis regarding the findings of 
the paper.  
 
The analysis clearly demonstrates that the Belarusian economy is currently very 
dependent on the trade relationship with the EU. Significant restrictions on Belarus-EU 
trading (or an embargo on commodities exports from Belarus as the most radical option) 
may appear to impact the country extremely negatively. Such an impact would entail 
structural changes within the Belarusian economy and numerous negative trends. The 
most significant ones would include: 
• GDP loss 
• Employment and revenue reductions (both for enterprises and the population), 
and/or concealed unemployment growth 
• Instability and imbalance within the internal currency market, BLR ruble 
devaluation, loss of a NBB currency resource share, and inflation growth 
• Budgetary income and expenditure reductions and budgetary deficit growth 
Alongside Russia which was previously the main economic partner for Belarus, the EU 
currently plays a significant role in Belarusian external economic policy.  
 
Introduction:   
In the past few years, Belarus has experienced significant transformations in its foreign 
trade sector. While the end of the 1990s through the beginning of this decade was 
characterized by a dependence on exports to the Russian Federation, during the last few 
years exports to non-CIS countries (EU mainly) have been rapidly developing. Such 
structural shifts in the foreign trade sector have substantially changed Belarus’ medium-
and long-term economic development prospects. Therefore, this study attempts to identify 
new leverages over the Belarusian economy and to evaluate the degree of its dependence 
on relationships with non-CIS countries, especially the US and EU. 
 
Since 2001, steady trends of increasing Belarusian exports to non-CIS countries have 
been observed. By 2005 the share of exports to non-CIS countries considerably exceeded 
those of CIS members (table1).  In the last few years export reorientation (from Russia to 
other markets) has been predominantly dependent on CIS countries (Ukraine in 
particular) rather than non-CIS ones. Nevertheless, within the 2001 – January-June, 2005 
period export growth to non-CIS countries exceeded the CIS export rate.   
 
The percentage of Belarusian cumulative exports to EU countries continues to increase 
(table 2).  Although trade relations between Belarus and the US are not well developed, 
they have remained relatively stable.  During the last three years, US exports and imports 
have comprised just over 1% of the overall export-import share in Belarus.  
 
Until 2003, a negative balance of foreign trade with EU countries can be observed 
(import exceeded export more than twice).  Since 2002, exports practically balanced 
imports, and in 2003 exceeded the latter by $1.054 Mio. In 2004 Belarus – EU 
commodity trade balance reached $1.804 Mio. 
 
In 2004 Belarus – EU commodity turnover growth stood at 36%, with exports at 41.1%, 
and by January-June of 2005 the latter rate fell to 31.1%. Compared to imports, export 
growth appeared to be more dynamic. In 2004 export growth to the EU countries could be 
partially explained by the EU enlargement. Nevertheless, export growth was also ensured 
by market expansion within the EU territory. 
Таble 1. Geographical export structure 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 half. 
2004 
1 half. 
2005 
CIS 
countries 
60.3 54.7 54.6 53.1 52.9 43.9 
Non-CIS 
countries 
39.7 45.3 45.4 46.9 47.1 56.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
 
Тable 2. Foreign trade with the US and the EU countries 
 
2003 2004 1 half. 2004 1 half. 2005  
$Mio % total $Mio % total $Mio % total $Mio % total 
EXPORT 
EU 3567 35.95043 37.0 2233 36.23257 44.1
USA 102 1.0 163 1.2 70.3 1.1 105 1.4
IMPORT 
EU 2513 21.73239 20.0 1383 20.01484 21.0
USA 150 1.3 195 1.19 70.5 1.0 97 1.4
BALANCE 
EU 1054 --1804 -- 850 --1773 --
USA -48 -- -32 -- -0 -- 8 --
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
 
 
 
The main export items of Belarus to the EU are: 
• Mineral products  
• Chemical industry output 
• Ferrous metals  
• Textile and textile goods  
• Wood and wood products 
For Belarus, the most important trade partners among EU members are Germany, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy.  
 
According to the National Bank official data, in 2004 81.8% of all mineral products, 
26.9% of ferrous metals, 23.7% of textile and textile goods, 18.6% of chemical and 9% of 
plastic outputs were exported to EU markets. 
 
Mineral products comprised the largest share of overall exports to non-CIS countries in 
the last five years. (Fig.1) In 2004 mineral production export to non-CIS countries 
comprised $ 3,367 Mio, and in January – June, 2005 - $ 2,356 Mio ($ 1466 Mio as for 
January – May, 2004). Thus, mineral production exports was growing constantly, which 
was 80-100% ensured by seller‘s market expansion in non-CIS countries. Mineral 
products largely contributed to the overall export growth. 
 
Mineral production export appeared to be considerably dependent on the separate markets 
of the EU countries. In the last years the largest share of oil products used to be exported 
to Great Britain, the Netherlands and Latvia. In January-June, 2005 oil and oil products 
delivered to the Netherlands comprised 40% of the export of all mineral products.  
 
During the last five years the chemical output share stood second among exports to non-
CIS countries. The largest share of chemical production is currently delivered to EU 
markets. Ferrous metals comprised 1/3 of overall export to non-CIS countries. Also, 
Belarusian textile and textile products are highly valued by European customers. 
 
In order to estimate Belarusian economic dependence on the US and EU countries lets 
assume an embargo is introduced on commodity exports to these countries. Imagine that 
this hypothetical situation gives no possibility for Belarus to export its goods intended for 
Western Europe and the US through Russia or other CIS countries. Thus, such an analysis 
would help to adequately evaluate the economic relationship between the EU and 
Belarus.  
 
The following analyzes the consequences of such an embargo introduction on Belarus and 
the immediate transformations which would inevitably follow. For a more detailed 
description of the shock influence mechanisms we divide this period into three stages. We 
will analyze the economic consequences for Belarusian real, monetary-credit, and 
budgetary sectors within every stage. 
Fig.1. Share of main export items to non-CIS countries 
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Fig. 2. Share of main export items to non-CIS countries within cumulative export 
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Economic consequences of embargo introduction:  
 
Stage 1: Output decreases, currency income losses, and  budget income decreases 
 
Real sector 
 
The embargo introduction would bring the most drastic consequences on  the oil industry 
(oil refinery). 80% of oil products, produced in Belarus, are exported to the EU ($ 2, 086 
Mio as of the first half of 2005). Moreover, overall Belarusian oil export ($ 165 Mio as 
for the first half of 2005) is also delivered to EU countries. Oil industry ensures more than 
20% of industrial output. Thus, due only to the oil industry GDP loss may reach 5 %.  
 
Smaller branches of industry (light, chemical, oil-chemical, and woodworking) would 
likely be less sensitive to an embargo. However, the consequences for these branches will 
be quite serious.  As the domestic market potential is totally exhausted, these industries 
would be forced to compete with their Russian counterparts, and any reorientation toward 
other non-CIS countries may require a certain period of time. Ferrous metallurgy and 
potash fertilities output would also likely be less affected by an embargo (in the 1st half 
of 2005 about 40% of ferrous metals and 19% of potash fertilities were exported to the 
EU countries). 
 
Monetary sector 
 
Introduction of an embargo on Belarus’ export to the EU countries would mean an abrupt 
currency loss for Belarusian exporters. The country’s enterprises currently receive about 
60% of overall export income from EU countries. An embargo would badly influence 
exporting of commodities which share in cumulative export income, which comprise a bit 
more than 50%. The impossibility of exporting to the EU would also considerably reduce 
income from service delivery to EU countries. For Belarus, a positive balance in service 
trade is more than 100% ensured by transport services exports, which is basically a part 
of the technological range of commodities exports (oil products and crude oil mainly). 
Therefore, the summary effect of embargo introduction during the first stage would be an 
abrupt currency income decrease (within 50-55%) for Belarusian residents.  
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Fig.3. The share of four main export items within the overall export to non-CIS countries 
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The trends on currency market segments listed below are not dependent on the date of an embargo 
introduction. The proposed date allows submission of approximate quantitative indices of tender outcome 
on these segments. 
Fig.4. The share of four main items exported to non-CIS countries within the cumulative export 
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If an embargo is introduced on January, 1, 20061  while other conditions remain the same 
(the absence of any significant price changes for oil, oil products, potassium, textiles and 
other commodities), export income loss will reach $ 2.200-2.500 Mio. In the case of an 
abrupt embargo introduction, Belarusian enterprises would have no time to update their 
import volumes.  As such, the first stage, export income losses, would hardly be 
compensated by import expenditures decreases. 
 
In such a situation the internal currency market would be forced to enact significant 
transformations. First, the juridical residents market would face serious changes. Given 
no chance for Belarusian enterprises to immediately decrease import expenditures as 
a counter-measure to export reductions, during the first stage they would attempt to 
reduce currency demand. Moreover, an expected deficit of currency resources may cause 
an opposite reaction – the enterprises may start to increase currency demand. Considering 
both trends one can assume that during the first stage the demand within the resident 
segment would in fact remain the same. Belarusian enterprises usually sell about 52-55% 
of export income. In the case of an embargo this share would be reduced to its minimum. 
They would most probably sell about 30% of received income, which is an obligatory 
rate. A range of directive measures, as well as the need for working capital, would force 
Belarusian enterprises to somewhat increase this share. Thus we assume Belarus’ 
enterprises would be selling about 30-35% of overall received income. Consequently, 
simultaneous reduction of export income volume and its share sold by residents on the 
internal currency market would cause a supply decrease (about 63-68%) if compared with 
an inertia scenario. 
 
Such supply and demand dynamics within the market segment would set (for the first 
quarter of 2006) the deficit at approximately $ 700-750 Mio. The non-resident segment 
would hardly run any significant transformations during the first stage. It would likely be 
characterized by a gradual decrease of non-residents’ demand and supply activities.  
Therefore, the share of the non-resident segment within the overall currency market 
would be reduced. In the first quarter of 2006, such a situation would be equivalent to the 
deficit of this segment of the market at the rate of $120-170 Mio. The demand for 
currency is likely to increase among the domestic market. However, the population would 
mainly increase currency demands within their current incomes, but would not start 
converting its ruble savings into currency. Therefore, currency demand increase is likely 
to follow as an initial reaction of the domestic market, while dimensions of currency 
supply would remain the same. In the first quarter of 2006, the situation would be 
equivalent to the deficit within the market segment at the rate of $ 180-230 Mio. As 
a result in the first quarter, after introduction of an embargo Belarus‘internal currency 
market would face a currency deficit at the rate of $1000 – 1150 Mio. 
 
 Fig. 5 The share of EU countries in Belarus’ export 
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Fig. 6. Growth of export to EU countries within overall export increase 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
01 02 03 04 1 пол.
05
%
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Budgetary sector 
 
Since during the first stage, the activity of Belarusian exporters would likely be notably 
limited, a significant reduction of budgetary income from external trade activities and 
operations can be expected. The current share of such income within the consolidated 
budgetary income comprises about 5.5%. 
 
Other important income sources are the income tax and the value-added tax (VAT). 
During the first stage as a result of a decrease in sales volume and, consequently, of 
profits for the aforementioned branches, the revenue from income taxes would be notably 
reduced. The decrease of VAT income would primarily not be that significant since 
Belarus‘export is zero-rate taxed, whereas the reduction of import, which is the main 
source of VAT income to the budget, would be running quite smoothly. 
 If an embargo was introduced and 90% of the activities of the 17 main enterprises-
exporters to the western markets were paralyzed, the budget  would lose about 12-13 % of 
tax income. Hence, this would considerably reduce the budgetary capacity of financing 
social programs and supporting various enterprises and branches (such as agriculture, 
municipal economy, construction, etc). 
 
Stage 2: influence over investments and labor market, devaluation of BLR ruble, currency 
resource decreases, and budget adaptation. 
 
Real sector 
Output reduction within the industries immediately affected by an embargo would bring 
negative consequences to the labor market. Mass redundancies are unlikely to follow so 
far as their social outcome is utterly destructive for the political regime. At the same time, 
transition to a less than full-time working week and other forms of concealed 
unemployment remain possible, as seen previously during critical periods of economic 
development in Belarus in order to reduce expenditures. Still, there is a possibility of 
salary decreases and/or wage arrears. 
 
Investment reduction is another consequence of introduction of an embargo. Since 
a number of enterprises – oil refinery and ferrous metallurgy in particular – are mainly 
supported by foreign investments, the suspension of support for these industries would 
notably affect the overall investment dynamics. Moreover, the negative influence of the 
decreases in the aforementioned branches in relation to the state budget and the economy 
as a whole would severely damage investment activity in other sectors.  
 
Monetary sector 
A growing deficit in the currency market would definitely require The National Bank of 
Belarus2 (NBB) to attempt to stabilize the situation. Other things being equal, the NBB 
would be forced to sell its currency reserves or devalue the BLR ruble. However, these 
two conducts cannot be fully considered as alternatives. If in such a situation the NBB 
intended to avoid devaluation, it would be obliged to sell its gold and currency reserves 
(NBB summary international reserves are in fact equivalent to the total of the expected 
deficit within the currency market). Thus, the NBB itself might provoke an inevitable 
ruble devaluation due to exhausted assets. If it were to refuse both to accept foreign 
currency investments and to consent to significant devaluation which could somewhat 
balance the currency market, the NBB would be forced to abruptly devalue the BLR ruble 
( 20-30% in real value) Due to the reaction of the population, such a scenario would 
entail further deficit growth in the currency market and, consequently, the necessity of 
using currency reserves. 
 
Therefore, during the second stage after the establishment of a significant deficit in the 
internal currency market, simultaneous NBB currency interventions and BLR ruble 
devaluation (up to 10-15 % in real value) would likely follow. Moreover, the NBB 
would likely be obliged to sell about $500-600 Mio of its reserved assets. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
2  We assume that economic trends within the three stages are inevitable, even with the intervention of the 
government and the NBB.  Economic policy measures may change the situation only after these inevitable 
consequences of an embargo introduction, which would last approximately 2 quarters, occur in Belarus.  
 
 
 Budgetary sector 
The abrupt decrease of budgetary income would entail the necessity of expenditure 
reductions.  The expenditures for less important enterprises and branches would most 
likely be reduced, so far as certain expenditures appear to be unavoidable (sowing 
campaign, financing, budgetary sphere, etc). Moreover, public utilities price growth and 
reductions of construction of housing and objects of socio-cultural importance, etc., may 
be expected. However, budgetary expenditure reduction would not seem to be so 
catastrophic, as the government would have the possibility to partially finance these 
expenditures using accumulated deposits.  
 
The scheduled campaigns for minimum wage increases may be postponed for an 
uncertain time.  Budgetary employees’ incomes may appear "stalled.“ Pension increases 
would likely be shelved due to the deterioration of the social insurance fund; in fact 
pensions may not be paid on time. 
 
The reduction of tax-income from enterprises-exporters against the backdrop of increases 
in budgetary debts through other industries would lead to a budgetary deficit increase and, 
consequently, the need to search for additional financing sources.  
 
Stage 3: cumulative and monetary demand decreases, inflation growth, and revision of 
budgetary parameters  
 
Real sector 
 
The reduction (or abrupt decrease in growth) of the population’s real income due to 
delays in salary payments and working time loss would entail a drop in household 
consumption fall. Alongside the decrease of investments into fixed capital, this would 
cause GDP loss. Also, due to the negative consequences of the embargo on the budget, a 
reduction of state consumption may be expected.  
 
On the other hand, income and investment decreases would ensure import demand 
reductions. However, within a short period of time this would not positively influence 
cumulative demand, so far as export decreases are to be quite dynamic. 
 
Monetary sector   
 
The BLR ruble devaluation may entail a significant decrease of demand for Belarusian 
rubles in circulation and savings.  Primarily due to decreases in incomes, money 
circulation would appear to be much more dynamic. A considerable decrease of real 
monetary demand would entail the formation of an excessive monetary mass within the 
economy, which would only aggravate inflation. Consequently, real interest rates would 
be notably reduced, thereby increasing demand for foreign currency amongst citizens and 
economic agents. This factor is likely to increase currency demand within the population 
at the rate of $700-800 Mio. Such conduct would additionally stimulate price growth 
within the economy due to excessive money and further pressure over currency exchange 
rates. Hence, the preconditions for a further deficit would be created within the currency 
market, and the inflation growth would reach 30-40% per year. 
 
Budgetary sector   
During the third stage, the income and expenditure sectors of the budget are likely to be 
reviewed. The deficit thus may increase up to 8-10% of GDP. Taxation growth may also 
be expected within the economy as a whole, and additional sources of budgetary deficit 
financing may be used. 
 
Remarks from the Pontis`s Institute for Civic Diplomacy:  
The declared success of the Belarus economy (GDP growth of 11% in 2004), as well as 
the results of exports into EU countries presented in this policy paper is based on a 
difference in “special“ import prices of raw materials for energy production from Russia 
(oil, natural gas) and its real value on the world markets.  
 
The presented statistics on foreign trade are attributable to the significant growth of value 
of exports into EU countries - namely, the value of oil products that form the bulk of 
Belarusian export increases. Those products are exported into EU countries at world 
prices, respectively with the prices for oil-fuel (diesel), gasoline, or for heating oils, 
created in the stock market in Rotterdam. However, these products are produced from 
Russian oil, the price of which for Belarus is significantly lower than actual world prices. 
Thanks to this, the distinctive difference between relative input (crude oil) and output 
(regular oil products) prices creates the basis for the success of the Belarusian economy 
and export. Therefore, there is an artificially lower pricing of oil products from Belarus, 
as prices of inputs for its production do not correspond with world prices, and they are 
markedly undervalued. However, this applies to other Belarusian export products as well.  
A substantial part of raw materials for energy inputs necessary for their production is 
based on undervalued prices of natural gas, which is the main source for production of 
electricity in Belarus.  
 
For Russian companies, indeed, supply of undervalued raw materials for energy-related 
production could present a win-win scheme. Assumptions can be made that the exporting 
of oil products from Belarus to EU markets is to a great extent done through corporations 
which are financially connected with Russian companies. The scheme can be as follows. 
Russian oil companies supply oil for undervalued prices to Belarusian refineries. Regular 
oil products are produced there which are thereafter exported to EU markets through 
corporations financially connected to the same Russian oil companies. The fact that the 
substantial part of such exports is implemented through the Netherlands and Great Britain 
only supports this assumption. It is widely known that Russian companies, including oil 
companies, have their subsidiary corporations established in these two exact countries. 
On the one hand they use tax relieves provided by Netherlands and Great Britain to trade 
with companies on certain conditions, and on the other hand, these corporations are 
eligible for benefits based on the fact that they are registered and working within the EU 
market. Further, people with direct contacts to the Belarusian presidential administration 
and government likely stand behind these companies since exporting is controlled and 
regulated by the state, which is especially relevant to the export of oil products.  
 
This trade import-export scheme is convenient for the ruling regime in Belarus. Russian 
companies have to respect the interests of the Belarusian administration in order for 
Russian oil companies to export regular oil products to EU markets. The Belarusian 
refinery in Mozyr is basically the single large-capacity refinery in the area of both Russia 
and Belarus, which is technologically able to produce oil products from Russian oil 
(especially diesel and heating oils) while meeting the demanding ecologic standards of 
the EU. Other refineries are either unable or extremely limited in their capacity to 
produce such products. Without meeting these standards, oil products from Russian and 
Belarusian refineries are not able to enter EU markets. Moreover, the Belarusian refinery 
also has an advantageous geographical location connecting it to EU markets.  
 
Prohibition of oil product exports from Belarus would not have any effect on the EU 
market. However, such a prohibition would undoubtedly strike the economic interests of 
Belarus as well as the private economic interests of members of the highest leadership of 
Belarus (presidential administration and government) and would have a very negative 
impact for them.  
 
